On March 1, the beginning of the holy month of Ramadan — noticed by most of Turkey’s Sunni inhabitants — the imprisoned chief of the banned Kurdistan Staff’ Celebration, Abdullah Öcalan, made a historic name for the social gathering to disarm and finish its 40-year-long armed wrestle in opposition to the Turkish state.
Although seemingly surprising, this name for peace — made just a few weeks earlier than Nowruz, the Kurdish New Yr, on March 20 — adopted months of negotiations between Turkey’s ruling coalition made up of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Improvement Celebration (AKP), Devlet Bahçeli’s Nationalist Motion Celebration (MHP) and Kurdish officers.
In a political panorama lengthy formed by battle, Erdoğan’s latest overtures to Kurdish political forces mark a putting shift. In his speech throughout his social gathering’s congress in Trabzon earlier this 12 months, Erdoğan emphasised the unity and shared historical past amongst Turks and Kurds — the latter of whom have lengthy been victims of imperialist designs of dividing the area and have been a mainstay of his populist rhetoric.
Change after all on the Kurds
Erdoğan’s speech prompt not solely a willingness to re-engage with Kurds but in addition the opportunity of a broader political compromise.
In October 2024, Erdoğan ally and MHP chief Bahçeli, in a transfer rigorously choreographed with the Turkish president’s change after all, opened the way in which to such a rapprochement by inviting Öcalan to parliament. Bahçeli additionally proposed Öcalan’s launch in alternate for a ceasefire.
Children maintain a big {photograph} of the jailed chief of the insurgent Kurdistan Staff’ Celebration, Abdullah Öcalan, as they collect to observe a reside TV broadcast detailing a press release from him in Diyarbakir, Turkey, in February 2025.
(AP Picture/Metin Yoksu)
This isn’t Erdoğan’s first try to resolve the Kurdish difficulty. In 2009, he launched the “Kurdish Opening,” geared toward ending the battle via dialogue. Comparable initiatives adopted in 2008–11 and 2013–15.
However all initiatives finally collapsed as a consequence of political disagreements, shifting alliances and Erdoğan’s more and more authoritarian strategy to governance.
This newest initiative follows the identical transactional logic that marked the sooner processes. Erdoğan’s renewed curiosity in participating with the Kurds seems pushed much less by a need for peace-making and extra by political necessity.
Domestically, Erdoğan’s AKP has grown more and more reliant on its alliance with ultra-nationalist MHP. Whereas this partnership secured his 2023 re-election as president, its fragility turned evident within the nation’s 2024 native elections, when opposition candidates gained key mayoral races all through the nation. They have been aided by the tacit help of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Celebration (DEM.)
Destabilizing the opposition
The method that led to Öcalan’s assertion from jail is kind of more likely to carry vital realignments to Turkish politics.
By participating with the broader Kurdish motion, Erdoğan seeks to destabilize the delicate and fractured opposition coalition, whose unity hinged on their shared opposition to him. Their continued relevance additionally relies on the tacit help of DEM and its Kurdish voters.
By opening a brand new dialogue, Erdoğan might tip the stability in his favour by positioning DEM as a privileged negotiating accomplice. Drawing Kurdish political help away from the opposition and securing Kurdish backing for constitutional reforms would enable him to hunt one other presidential time period.
With 57 parliamentary seats, DEM holds vital sway and may make all of the distinction if Erdoğan initiates a constitutional modification course of.
Regional and strategic implications
Erdoğan’s overtures additionally carry vital regional implications. Turkey’s navy operations in Syria and Iraq have strained relations with Kurdish factions throughout the area.
On the identical time, Turkey has strengthened ties with Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Authorities, highlighting Erdoğan’s pragmatism when coping with Kurdish entities.
By addressing the Kurdish difficulty domestically, Erdoğan might strengthen his hand regionally, maybe replicating his co-operation with Iraq in relations with the Democratic Union Celebration in Northern Syria, positioning Turkey as a stabilizing drive in each Iraq and Syria.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, left, and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani alternate signed agreements throughout a gathering in Baghdad, Iraq, in April 2024. It was Erdoğan’s first official go to to Iraq in additional than a decade.
(Ahmad Al-Rubaye /Pool Picture by way of AP)
What comes subsequent?
Regardless of Erdoğan’s conciliatory tone, the way forward for this peace course of stays extremely unsure. Earlier negotiations unravelled as a consequence of unresolved questions on Kurdish political autonomy, cultural rights and power-sharing.
The AKP’s emphasis on disarmament with out addressing broader Kurdish political calls for resulted within the eventual breakdown of dialogue.
MHP chief Devlet Bahçeli after voting in Ankara, Turkey, in March 2019.
(AP Picture/Ali Unal)
Inner divisions inside Kurdish political forces additionally complicate the method. Whereas Öcalan’s affect stays robust, some Kurdish factions might resist concessions with out significant political ensures. And regardless of Bahçeli’s latest statements, Erdoğan’s MHP allies stay deeply skeptical of any reconciliation efforts.
As Nowruz approaches, Erdoğan’s engagement with Kurdish political forces might culminate in a brand new section of dialogue — or function a strategic manoeuvre to consolidate energy forward of the subsequent election cycle.
Whether or not his shift results in real reconciliation or stays a political gambit will rely upon Erdoğan’s willingness to deal with Kurdish calls for for autonomy and cultural recognition.
If the previous is any indicator, pro-Kurdish events and civil society organizations at the moment engaged in negotiations might as soon as once more be discarded in the event that they not serve Erdoğan’s pursuits. For now, the Kurdish query stays one of the important — and risky — fault traces in Turkish politics.
Whether or not lasting peace is on the horizon, or one other cycle of repression and battle, will rely upon how any potential peace course of unfolds within the coming months.
