Whereas america talked army help and minerals with Ukraine, Russia did the identical with considered one of its few remaining allies: Myanmar.
On March 4, 2025, the commander in chief and chief of Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing, visited Russia. It was his fourth official go to since a coup in 2021 noticed the army seize energy.
That coup ended a decade-long power-sharing association between the military and the democratically elected authorities in Myanmar, sparking peaceable protests that quickly developed right into a nationwide armed resistance often known as the Spring Revolution and an ensuing authorities crackdown.
The ensuing civil battle – now into its fourth yr – has seen 6,000-plus individuals killed, 29,000 arrested and greater than 3.3 million displaced, based on estimates from the human rights group Help Affiliation for Political Prisoners. The battle pits the nation’s army, which has had a stranglehold on Myanmar’s politics for a lot of the previous six a long time, towards a broad-based opposition that features ethnic minority teams just like the Karen Nationwide Union, Kachin Independence Military, Arakan Military, Ta’ang Nationwide Liberation Military, Myanmar Nationwide Democratic Alliance Military, Folks’s Protection Pressure and Bamar Folks’s Liberation Military.
With seemingly no instant finish to the combating in sight, all sides have gotten more and more reliant on overseas suppliers of weapons and gas.
And this prompts an vital query: Might the shifting insurance policies and alignments of world powers – notably China, Russia and the U.S. – tip the steadiness of Myanmar’s civil battle?
Russia: Myanmar’s ‘forever friend’
All through the civil battle, Myanmar’s generals have turned to Russia for assist. Each nations are closely sanctioned and seen as “pariah states,” so it’s, in some ways, a handy alignment.
Russian President Vladimir Putin greets Myanmar Prime Minister Min Aung Hlaing on March 4, 2025, in Moscow, Russia.
Getty Photos
In his newest go to to Moscow, Min Aung Hlaing granted Russia rights to extract minerals in Myanmar’s battle zones and construct an oil refinery and a port within the coastal metropolis Dawei.
Russia has exported oil to Myanmar for a lot of a long time. For the reason that invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has been utilizing the Southeast Asian nation as a route to move oil to China in an try to mitigate the influence of Western sanctions on vitality exports. Myanmar has additionally agreed to provide expert employees to Russia in a deal to alleviate the nation’s labor shortages.
This mutual association additionally extends to protection and safety issues. Myanmar and Russia interact in joint naval workout routines, and Moscow is a high provider of weapons to Myanmar’s generals and trains personnel for the army authorities.
However any diplomatic profit from having Russia as a sponsor has been blunted as a result of Moscow’s lack of worldwide assist over the battle in Ukraine. Ought to that change, as the brand new U.S. administration appears eager on, then it may gain advantage Myanmar’s army by giving the generals a stronger ally on the worldwide stage.
As such, warming relations between Russia and the U.S. might be to the detriment of Myanmar’s myriad opposition teams. Already, the Trump administration’s insurance policies imply that the resistance can not depend on the identical stage of assist from Washington, and it’s no assure that European Union nations – already going through the prospect of withdrawn U.S. assist for Ukraine – would step in to fill the hole.
US pivots away from Myanmar
Washington has nominally supported the Spring Revolution.
The U.S. gives shelter to Myanmar dissidents, together with exiled leaders of the Nationwide Unity Authorities, or NUG, and has pushed for sanctions towards the military.
However that assist has been largely symbolic. The U.S. nonetheless has not formally acknowledged the NUG because the authentic authorities of Myanmar – a call that stops Washington from releasing US$1 billion held on the Federal Reserve to the democratic representatives. That cash might be used each to bolster the resistance and ship much-needed assist to the nation’s individuals.
U.S. overseas coverage because it evolves underneath the Trump administration is having additional ripples in Myanmar.
The Trump White Home has gutted the U.S. Company for Worldwide Growth, the division tasked with funding Myanmar by way of 2023’s Burma Act, which approved sanctions on the army, assist for these opposing the junta and help for Myanmar’s individuals.
Providers similar to Voice of America and Radio Free Asia have been suspended amid the current U.S. cutbacks. In consequence, individuals in Myanmar have more-limited entry to dependable info and, extra importantly, fewer media to characterize and amplify their voices.
Whether or not the U.S. chooses to proceed to assist the opposition or interact with the army authorities and endorse Myanmar elections anticipated for later this yr may have vast implications for the way forward for democracy within the nation.
U.S. President Barack Obama inspired Myanmar opposition chief Aung San Suu Kyi to participate in elections.
Soe Than Win/AFP by way of Getty Photos
Myanmar has witnessed such a U.S. reversal earlier than.
For an extended interval, Washington supported the opposition’s boycott of elections that assured the ability to the army. However in 2009, the U.S. administration underneath Barack Obama despatched a message to the Nationwide League for Democracy (NLD), which on the time was underneath the management of now-imprisoned Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, that Washington would acknowledge the army’s elections as a part of a coverage of “pragmatic engagement” with the then-ruling junta.
It pressured the recalcitrant NLD to cooperate by coming into the 2012 by-elections – the primary time it had taken half in elections since 1990.
Though the NLD gained a sweeping victory – and went on to win the 2015 nationwide vote – it meant giving legitimacy to a system rigged in favor of the army, with 1 / 4 of parliamentary seats reserved for officers. Provided that 75% approval was wanted for any constitutional reform, it meant that the NLD may kind a authorities however may solely make selections with the consent of the still-powerful generals.
The political scenario now’s totally different from 2012. The yearslong resistance has weakened the army considerably. And even when the NUG, which consists of member of the NLD and different political events, does really feel compelled to take part in elections, the varied different resistance teams and ethnic armies will doubtless select in any other case. Regional autonomy has turn into a actuality because of the decentralized nature of the resistance motion; elections is not going to fulfill the varied calls for for autonomy.
Chinese language push for stability
The U.S. administration’s discount in assist and, probably, assist for Myanmar’s opposition may paved the way to China taking a better function in shaping the course of the civil battle.
Beijing, like Washington, had historically had a detailed relationship with the opposition NLD. President Xi Jinping visited Myanmar in 2020 and signed a collection of infrastructure offers as a part of China’s Belt and Street Initiative.
After the 2021 coup, China initially drew again from supporting Myanmar. However Beijing has since tried to revive stalled or canceled bilateral initiatives whereas supporting reconciliation efforts and positioning itself as a impartial mediator.
China’s essential concern is spillover from the battle. For that motive, Beijing turned involved when an alliance of armed ethnic teams launched a serious anti-military push in October 2023, fearing the unfold of instability throughout the China-Myanmar border.
For the reason that civil battle broke out, Chinese language investments in Myanmar have stalled. In the meantime, lawlessness inside Myanmar has led to the expansion of largely Chinese language-run on-line rip-off facilities – victims of which embody Chinese language residents who’ve been kidnapped, trafficked and compelled to work as scammers.
What China needs most is a steady Myanmar. But its chosen technique to attempt to convey this about – forcing fighters to signal ceasefire agreements – hasn’t labored to date.
This might change. The discount of U.S. assist in Myanmar locations an extra burden on ethnic resistance teams – they now need to shoulder extra of the burden of offering for the individuals whereas combating for autonomy. As such, resistance teams is perhaps underneath better urgency to just accept China’s function as a mediator. And with that modified calculus, the crucial to discover a negotiated answer might improve.
However a rushed ceasefire born of necessity doesn’t equate to a long-lasting answer. As such, the shifting geopolitics of Russia, the U.S. and China might influence Myanmar’s civil battle – however it would do little to encourage democracy within the nation, nor put it on a path to lasting peace.
