In late February 2025, senior Hamas chief and ex-chairman of its politburo, Mousa Abu Marzouk, stated he wouldn’t have supported Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023, assault on Israel had he identified how damaging Israel’s response would have been.
That remarkably frank admission takes on renewed relevance now, simply weeks later, after the resumption of Israel’s brutal bombing marketing campaign. Airstrikes since March 18 have already claimed lots of of Palestinian lives and formally ended a tenuous ceasefire deal.
As an skilled on Palestinian politics, I consider the return to energetic battle within the Gaza Strip speaks – on the Palestinian facet of the equation – to the continuing gross energy imbalance of Hamas’ navy place vis-a-vis Israel, and the group’s lack of strategic foresight in failing to anticipate the obvious willingness of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to return to combating.
Asymmetrical ‘peacefare’
It’s no secret that Netanyahu and his coalition companions confirmed little curiosity in totally implementing the ceasefire deal that was partly brokered by Donald Trump’s Center East envoy, Steve Witkoff, and signed on Jan. 19.
The deal was cut up into two predominant phases adopted by a post-conflict reconstruction part.
Within the first spherical, Hamas freed Israeli hostages in return for the discharge of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and the resumption of assist into Gaza. After that, a second spherical of negotiations was supposed to see the discharge of all remaining Israel hostages in Hamas custody in trade for the entire withdrawal of Israel’s forces from Gaza – and an finish to the battle.
A hearth breaks out in an residence after the Israeli military’s assault on Gaza’s Bureij Refugee Camp on March 19, 2025.
Moiz Salhi/Anadolu through Getty Pictures
However from the start, there have been widespread issues that Netanyahu wouldn’t have the ability to ship on the second part of the ceasefire deal – and hypothesis that he had no private or political intentions of doing so.
The Trump administration primarily took the identical place. Statements by the U.S. president expressing a need to take over Gaza – with the accompanying implication that Palestinians residing there must depart – underscored the dearth of dedication to the second part of the ceasefire.
Hamas was conscious of those realities. However the militant governing authority seemingly felt it had little different choice than to pursue the phrases of the ceasefire whereas holding onto the one supply of leverage it nonetheless had – the remaining Israeli hostages, believed to encompass about 59 folks with maybe lower than half of them nonetheless alive. Certainly, that leverage was tied to seeing by way of the second stage of a ceasefire.
After all, a part of Hamas’ curiosity within the ceasefire was that it supplied the group the prospect to stay in energy whereas delivering to Hamas the chance of boasting that it had secured the discharge of 1000’s of jailed Palestinians.
A scarcity of strategic foresight
However regardless of Hamas’ apparent disadvantages through the ceasefire, it’s essential to give attention to how the group considerably failed to understand a number of exterior components.
For one, Hamas leaders appeared to consider, for a lot of causes, that that they had extra time to barter than they did. That perception relied partly on the understanding that Israeli public opinion polls indicated {that a} majority of the general public favors an finish to the battle in trade for releasing all Israeli hostages in a single bundle.
Furthermore, Adam Boehler, Trump’s hostage envoy, had just lately opened up a direct communication channel between the U.S. and Hamas – one thing that hadn’t occurred for many years – over the discharge of twin U.S.-Israel citizen Edan Alexander.
And within the days working up the resumption of combating, Hamas and Israel officers had been assembly with U.S., Qatari and Egyptian counterparts, the place they have been discussing a proposal to increase the primary part by way of the tip of Ramadan whereas negotiations continued over the ultimate stage.
But others have been seemingly conscious that the ceasefire was on borrowed time. U.S. envoy Witkoff, in blaming Hamas for allegedly balking on the extension proposal – one thing Hamas denies – explicitly famous on March 14: “Hamas is making a very bad bet that time is on its side. It is not.”
Section one of many ceasefire plan noticed the discharge of 1000’s of Palestinian prisoners.
Hani Alshaer/Anadolu through Getty Pictures
Hamas additionally appeared to have miscalculated the political state of affairs in Israel. It seemingly learn an excessive amount of into the fractures inside the Israeli safety institution, together with Netanyahu’s intent to fireside the chief of Israel’s inner safety company, Ronen Bar – seeing in these developments indicators that Gaza was immune from any fast resumption to the combating amid inner Israeli splits.
However removed from signaling a short-term weak point, Netanyahu’s safety shake-ups have merely eliminated dissenting voices.
Lastly, Hamas let its personal restricted success go to its head. It emerged from the preliminary ceasefire in a position to current the group as triumphant as a combating pressure that had nonetheless not been vanquished and will pressure Israel to the negotiating desk. That was on full show by way of its media machine through the six weeks of handovers of Israeli hostages, by which Hamas’ repeated propaganda shows throughout hostage handovers angered Israeli public opinion, in addition to Israeli political and safety officers.
Rising rift
The place issues go from right here is tough to foretell. For now, Netanyahu seems all too completely satisfied to return to a full-scale battle that retains his far-right coalition members completely satisfied, makes new elections much less probably and retains him protected from the looming legal costs he must face as soon as out of workplace.
But for the entire struggling for bizarre Palestinians that battle ensures, Hamas seems extra adrift than ever. There stays a transparent rift between its political management – primarily based in Qatar and Turkey – who’re extra concerned about diplomacy, and the pinnacle of the navy wing in Gaza, Mohammed Sinwar, whose brother Yahya – mastermind of the Oct. 7 assaults – was killed by Israel final fall.
However except for a need for revenge towards Israel and remaining the first energy dealer in Gaza, Hamas has constantly struggled to articulate an achievable long-term technique for assuaging the struggling of Palestinians in Gaza. The resumption of the battle is unlikely to vary that.
