In early December 2024, Hamas introduced a significant concession: It was ready to cede future governance of Gaza to a unity Palestinian committee, working alongside its chief political rival, Fatah, to create the physique.
Fatah, the get together of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, has since expressed hesitancy about such an association – which, in any occasion, would face stern opposition from Israel and certain the U.S., too.
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However the truth that Hamas would strike such a take care of a faction it took up arms towards for the suitable to manipulate Gaza within the first place factors to the militant group’s weakened place after greater than a 12 months of Israel’s devastating battle in Gaza.
Israel’s latest ceasefire settlement in Lebanon has additional broken Hamas’ prospects by curbing Hezbollah’s direct help in Gaza and by extension that of Iran – leaving it much more remoted.
Hemmed in on all sides, Hamas has, from my observations as an skilled on Palestinian politics, shifted its calculus for a post-Gaza battle world. That it was Egypt pushing for a Fatah-Hamas deal can also be noteworthy, as what in the end transpires by way of Gaza’s governance will seemingly hinge on the needs of the governments in Cairo and Israel, each of which sees Gaza because the yard of its nationwide safety.
An Egyptian plan for Gaza
Egypt, with tacit help from america, has been centered on what a future Palestinian political association in Gaza may seem like. To attempt to deal with this safety and governance vacuum, Egypt convened the leaders of each the Fatah motion and Hamas in early December in hopes of building a governing committee to take over Gaza’s governance as soon as the battle ends.
In Cairo, Egyptian mediators proposed the institution of a group help committee to be made up of Palestinian professionals and technocrats not affiliated with Fatah or Hamas. Abbas, who as chief of the Palestinian Authority has governance powers within the West Financial institution, topic to Israeli approval, would wish to approve the committee.
Hamas’ fast acceptance of the Egyptian formulation factors to a gaggle going through a far completely different safety and organizational atmosphere than it did previous to the escalation of battle with Israel.
Shifting regional dynamics
When Hamas launched its assaults on Oct. 7, 2023, it did so understanding it might depend on lively navy help from its Hezbollah allies in neighboring Lebanon and ongoing monetary and diplomatic cowl from Iran.
Quick-forward 14 months, the place of Tehran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” seems to be much more tenuous. Hezbollah and Israel’s months of tit-for-tat violence alongside the Israeli-Lebanese border escalated into full-scale warfare that noticed Israel develop its brutal navy marketing campaign into southern Lebanon. Hezbollah emerged from that struggle severely wounded, having misplaced quite a few members of its management to Israeli bombs.
The next Nov. 26 ceasefire has successfully taken Hezbollah out of the Gaza battle.
In the meantime, Iran, which has exchanged rounds of missile volleys with Israel, has up to now been eager to outsource direct confrontation towards Israel to its Hamas and Hezbollah proxies, in search of to keep away from a protracted navy engagement with Israel.
With that regional navy help curtailed, Hamas additionally finds itself going through a modified diplomatic panorama.
Since 2012, Qatar has hosted Hamas’ political management beneath an settlement with america. The small Gulf nation has since acted as a mediator between Hamas and Israel and america, which refuse to barter with the group instantly.
However in early November, Qatar introduced it was suspending its position in mediating Gaza peace talks, citing dissatisfaction with the method, although it has since advised talks could also be regaining momentum and that it was as soon as once more mediating.
In any case, U.S. officers have not too long ago pushed Qatar to shutter its Hamas political workplace, and remaining Hamas political operatives there have reportedly decamped to Turkey.
Qatar can also be eyeing a modified U.S. political scene, the place an incoming Republican-led Congress and President-elect Donald Trump are prone to exert a fair tougher line on Hamas having any form of political base outdoors of Gaza.
Decimated, each militarily and politically
Alongside growing isolation, Hamas has additionally sustained deep operational injury in the midst of the Gaza battle.
The latest Israeli killing of Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar triggered a vacuum on the very high. That got here after Israel had already killed a lot of the senior navy and political Hamas management in Gaza, to not point out high-profile political leaders outdoors of Gaza resembling Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh, who was assassinated in July in Iran.
It’s not even clear who makes up Hamas management in Gaza as of December 2024, apart from Sinwar’s brother, Mohammed, who’s a member of the navy wing of Hamas. Neither is it clear whether or not Hamas members outdoors of Gaza may even talk with leaders inside.
For now, distinguished Hamas chief Khalil al-Hayya has been concerned within the talks with Fatah in Egypt. Nonetheless, the chief committee of the Palestine Liberation Group – of which Fatah is the dominant faction – rejected the Egyptian proposal.
That doesn’t imply the proposal is essentially lifeless within the water – simply that Egypt must work with Fatah leaders to deal with their issues.
A depleted motion eyes the longer term
Whereas Hamas has been weakened militarily and politically, there may be additionally little likelihood that Hamas won’t stay an ideologically potent drive, able to drawing help from the various Palestinians in Gaza, in addition to the West Financial institution and the broader Palestinian diaspora.
However as a governing entity, Hamas seems to be a spent drive for the foreseeable future – one thing that members of the group readily acknowledge.
Mahmoud al-Aloul, a senior Fatah politician, meets with Mussa Abu Marzuk of Hamas at a dialogue hosted by China on July 23, 2024.
Pedro Pardo/AFP by way of Getty Pictures
The latest Egyptian-hosted Palestinian talks, nonetheless fitfully, level to how any long-term future for Gaza – or the Palestinians as an entire – requires a extra cohesive Palestinian political management.
Certainly, one shortcoming of the most recent Egyptian plan is that it doesn’t unite the Palestinians beneath a unified authorities, as a result of the governing entity proposed shall be accountable just for overseeing the Gaza Strip.
And belief between Hamas and Fatah stays low, because it has ever since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in June 2007 following a violent confrontation with Fatah.
But even when Hamas and Fatah would agree on a unity authorities, the broader actuality is that can’t occur as long as Israel and its worldwide allies, mainly america, oppose it.
For his half, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly acknowledged that neither the Palestinian Authority nor Hamas will play any position within the day after the battle.
When the battle is over
But aside from a everlasting Israeli navy occupation, it’s arduous to see what choices exist for Palestinians going ahead absent some unification in Palestinian politics.
When Hamas gained a significant victory in Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006, it was in no small measure as a consequence of Fatah divisions, corruption, widespread dissatisfaction with what the Oslo peace course of had delivered and little signal for future progress towards a Palestinian state.
Virtually 20 years later, none of these realities has meaningfully modified.
The devastation in Gaza has solely compounded the humanitarian disaster and the problem of charting a long-term answer. But when the battle in Gaza does come to an finish, there shall be no choice however for Arab nations, together with Egypt, the U.S. and the broader worldwide group to assist Palestinians within the enclave rebuild and search some measure of safety. The Palestinians who stay there can’t afford one other governance failure.
